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CASENOTES

STATE TOLLING STATUTES AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE: BENDIX

A UTOLITE

CORPORATION V. MID WESCO ENTERPRISES

IN

1974, Midwesco Enterprises (an Illinois corporation with its
principle place of business in Illinois) contracted with the Bendix
Autolite Corporation (a Delaware corporation with its principle
place of business in Ohio) to supply and install a coal-fired boiler
system at the Bendix facility in Fostoria, Ohio. Once the boiler
was in place, Bendix claimed that the system had been improperly
installed and failed to produce the quantity of steam specified by
the contract. In 1980, six years after entering into the contract,
Bendix filed a diversity action against Midwesco for fraud and
breach of contract in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.'
Midwesco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bendix's suit was barred by Ohio's four-year statute of limitations period for actions brought under a fraud or breach of contract
claim. 2 In response, Bendix claimed that section 2305.15 of the
Ohio Revised Code tolls the running of the statutory period for
bringing actions against persons, including private corporations,
who are out of state and have not designated an agent for service
of process within Ohio.3 Midwesco argued that the tolling statute

1. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 108 S. Ct. 2218, 2219 (1988).
2. Ohio allows a plaintiff four years to bring an action for breach of a contract for
the sale of goods, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.98(A) (Baldwin 1988), and four years to
bring an action for fraud, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(C) (Baldwin 1984).
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Baldwin Supp. 1987) provides:
(A) When a cause of action accrues against a person, if he is out of the
state, has absconded, or conceals himself, the period of limitation for the commencement of the action as provided in sections 2305.04 to 2305.14, 1302.98,
and 1304.29 of the Revised Code does not begin to run until he comes into the
state or while he is so absconded or concealed. After the cause of action accrues
if he departs from the state, absconds, or conceals himself, the time of his ab-
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violated both the commerce clause and the due process clause of
the Constitution. The district court agreed and granted
Midwesco's motion for summary judgment.'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, ruling that the tolling statute discriminated
against foreign corporations by forcing them to choose between
appointing a corporate agent within the state, thereby exposing

themselves to personal jurisdiction in Ohio's courts, or foregoing a
statute of limitations defense to any action brought against them
in Ohio.5 Bendix appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which noted probable jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Ohio's tolling statute.' The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' decision and held that section 2305.15, as applied to foreign corporations, impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court, prior to this decision, had not considered
the validity of a state tolling statute under the commerce clause.
Section 2305.15, however, indirectly invoked the licensing provisions applicable to foreign corporations contained in section
1703.041 of the Ohio Revised Code.7 The Court had invalidated
licensing statutes similar to the one invoked by Ohio's tolling statute. On the other hand, the Court had upheld a challenge to a
state tolling statute under the equal protection clause.

sence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of a period within which
the action must be brought.
Ohio courts have construed the term "person," as used in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.15, to include private corporations, Moss v. Standard Drug, 159 Ohio St. 464, 469,
112 N.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1953), and have routinely applied it to toll the period of limitations for actions brought against foreign corporations. See, e.g., Seeley v. Expert, Inc., 26
Ohio St. 2d 61, 65, 269 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1971); May v. Leidli, 32 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37,
513 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (1986); Barile v. University of Virginia, 30 Ohio App. 3d 190, 19495, 507 N.E.2d 448, 452-53 (1986); Scheer v. Air-Shields, Inc., 61 Ohio App. 2d 205, 206
n.l, 401 N.E.2d 478, 479 n.l (1979); Durham v. Anka Research Ltd., 60 Ohio App. 2d
239, 242-43, 396 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (1978).
4. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2220.
5. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 820 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir.
1987)(citing McKinley v. Combustion Eng'g, 575 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Idaho 1983)).
6. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987).
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.041 (Baldwin 1986). To avoid the consequences of
section 2305.15, a foreign corporation must appoint an agent to receive service of process
within the state of Ohio as provided by 'section 1703.041. See infra note 47.
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Commerce Clause Cases

The commerce clause gives Congress the power "to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states." 8 This language imposes

no express limitation upon Congress' exercise of the commerce
power, nor upon the scope of concurrent state regulation. The au-

thority granted by the Constitution, however, vests the commerce
power in Congress alone.9 Therefore, any state regulation in conflict with a federal law passed pursuant to the commerce clause
will be struck down under the supremacy clause.10 Where Congress has enacted no law, however, the courts have determined the

permissible scope of state regulation of commerce under the socalled "dormant" commerce clause.1

In early cases, courts attempted to draw a bright line between
"interstate" and "intrastate" commerce.' Commercial activities
that called for uniform regulation on a national level were considered to be "interstate," while activities that required regulation
keyed to local conditions or practices were considered to be "intra-

state."' 3 A state law that directly regulated interstate activities

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824).
10. Id. at 210-11. See, e.g., Alaska v. F/V Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Alaska),
cert. denied, 469 US. 823 (1984).
11. See generally I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 11.1-.10 (1986); but see Redish & Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569 (arguing that there exists no textual nor legitimate theoretical basis for
judical activism under a dormant commerce clause).
12. The distinction derives from Justice Marshall's statement that the language of
the commerce clause does not "comprehend commerce which is completely internal . . .
and which does not extend to or effect other states." Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
The propriety of state regulation in the intrastate area has never been seriously challenged.
13. This was the "Cooley rule of selective exclusivity," set forth by Justice Curtis in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The Cooley rule stated that:
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [the commerce] power
requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the
subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national,
or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
Id. at 319; see 1 R. ROTUNDA, J.NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 11, at § 11.4.
Although the Cooley rule may have compelled exclusive federal regulation of certain
economic activities, it did not necessarily preclude state regulation in areas where Congress
had not acted. That position was taken in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875). Justice
Field wrote: "The fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to
govern inter-state commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on this subject . . . is
equivalent to a declaration that inter-state commerce shall be free and untrammelled." Id.
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would be found invalid per se under the commerce clause.' 4 Thus,
each case turned on the court's characterization of the underlying
transaction as either interstate or intrastate.
A typical case adopting this approach was Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant,'5 where the constitutionality of a Kentucky law requiring foreign corporations to register with the state
in order to do business there was at issue. Dahnke-Walker, a Tennessee corporation, contracted with Bondurant, a Kentucky resident, to purchase his wheat crop. Delivery was to occur in Kentucky at the local depot of a common carrier from which DahnkeWalker intended to ship the wheat to its mill in Tennessee. When
Bondurant refused to deliver, Dahnke-Walker brought an action
for breach of contract in Kentucky state court. Bondurant alleged
that Dahnke-Walker had not registered to do business in the state,
thereby rendering the sales contract unenforceable. The Kentucky
court agreed with Bondurant.' 8 The Supreme Court, however,
concluded that even though the parties entered into the contract
in Kentucky and agreed to performance in Kentucky, DahnkeWalker ultimately intended to ship the grain to Tennessee, making the sale a matter of interstate rather than intrastate commerce. The Court announced the rule that:
A corporation of one State may go into another, without obtaining the leave or license of the latter, for all the legitimate
purposes of such commerce; and any statute of the latter State
which obstructs or lays a burden on the exercise of this privilege
17
is void under the commerce clause.
The Kentucky law was found to impermissibly burden interstate
trade, and was declared void as applied to the transaction at
issue.18
In more modern decisions, courts have developed a more flex-

at 282. The Court continues to embrace this interpretation of congressional inactivity as an
advocation of free trade and to strike down state attempts to regulate commerce. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 577-80.
14. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) and subsequent decisions. A partial listing of the Supreme Court decisions reaching this result
appears in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 392 n.7 (1952).
15. 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
16. Id. at 286-87.
17. Id. at 291 (citations omitted). See also Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S.
197, 203-04 (1914); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57
(1891).
18. Dahnke-Walker, 257 U.S. at 290-91.
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ible approach to these cases.' " The analysis has remained factspecific, but courts now look to the national and state interests
affected by the state regulation rather than to the nature of the
underlying transaction. In determining the scope of permissible

state regulation, the courts attempt to balance these competing
federal and state interests.2" Where the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the legitimate state interest advanced by the regulation, the statute is invalid;21 but where the burden imposed by

the regulation is incidental, and does not fall exclusively on interstate commerce, some interference with interstate commerce will

be tolerated.22
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs,23 the Supreme Court

examined a New Jersey registration statute similar to the one
struck down in Dahnke-Walker. Eli Lilly, an Indiana corporation,
sought to enjoin Say-On-Drugs, a New Jersey corporation, frnm
selling Lilly's products below a fixed minimum retail price. In addition to selling to New Jersey wholesalers, Eli Lilly maintained a
sales office in New Jersey that promoted the sale of Lilly's prod-

19. This flexible approach has its origins in the expansive interpretation of "interstate commerce" that underlaid judicial acceptance of New Deal legislation. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941). After these cases, the distinction between "interstate" and "intrastate" commercial
activity that underlaid prior commerce clause jurisprudence became meaningless. In its
place, the Court sought to distinguish between the local and national interests at issue
under any state regulation of commercial activity. See, e.g., Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-71 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938). In Southern Pacific, Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
majority, embraced Professor Dowling's theory that the proper role for the Court, in the
absence of express congressional action, was to balance the national and local interests
affected by the challenged statute. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27
VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
20. The mechanics of this balancing test have been conveniently summarized by Justice Stewart as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)(citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1976).
23. 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
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ucts and occasionally solicited orders from New Jersey hospitals
and physicians. Say-on-Drugs moved to dismiss the suit, claiming
that Eli Lilly had failed to obtain a certificate authorizing it to do
business within the state as required by New Jersey law. The Supreme Court ruled that, although the transactions on which Eli
Lilly brought suit were interstate in nature, the business conducted by its New Jersey office gave it sufficient contacts within
the state to be considered as "doing business" there for the purposes of its licensing statute. 4 The Court found that New Jersey's
interests in regulating strictly local activity outweighed any federal interest in preserving Eli Lilly's interstate activity.2 5 Therefore, the Court held that New Jersey could properly require Eli
Lilly to obtain a certificate before availing itself of that state's
courts. 26
The Supreme Court, however, has not entirely abandoned analyzing the characteristics of an underlying transaction in order to
distinguish between interstate and intrastate commerce. In Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman,27 the Court looked to the nature of
the transaction between Allenberg Cotton, a Tennessee cotton
broker, and Pittman, a Mississippi farmer, to determine whether
Mississippi could properly bar Allenberg from suing on a contract.
Pittman arranged, through an independent agent acting on Allenberg's behalf, to deliver his cotton crop to a local Mississippi
warehouse for resale on the national market. Allenberg maintained no contacts within the state of Mississippi other than
through its independent contractor. The Court found the cotton
market to be national in scale and therefore interstate in nature.28
Following the "underlying transaction" analysis of DahnkeWalker, the Supreme Court found the state licensing statute invalid as applied to Allenberg and similarly situated corporations.29
In each of these cases, the state licensing statute under scru-

24. Id. at 280-81.
25. Justice Harlan stated, "I am not prepared [to invalidate the New Jersey statute]
at the expense of state power to regulate the promotion of sales of goods owned and located
within the State when the countervailing federal considerations are as thin as they seem to
me to be here .... " Id. at 297 (J. Harlan, concurring).
26. "[1It is equally well-settled that if Lilly is engaged in intrastate as well as interstate aspects of the New Jersey drug business, the State can require it to get a certificate of
authority to do business [within the state]." Id. at 279 (citing Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1930)).
27. 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 34.
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tiny discriminated against out-of-state corporations on its face.
Where the facts indicated that the corporation was adversely affected by the statute and was engaged solely in interstate commerce within the host state, the Court struck down the statute as

invalid per se under the dormant commerce clause. 30
B. Equal Protection Clause Cases
The Ohio tolling statute only affects interstate commerce in-

directly by prodding foreign corporations to appoint a statutory
agent within the state.3 The Court recently entertained a challenge to a New Jersey tolling statute, similar to section 2305.15,
under the equal protection clause.
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn32 began as a personal injury ac-

tion brought by Cohn against Searle, a national manufacturer of
pharmaceutical products, in a New Jersey state court. The case
was removed to federal court, and Searle subsequently moved for
summary judgment under New Jersey's two-year statute of limita-

tions. Cohn contended that the period of limitations had tolled
under section 2A:14-22 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes.

Searle contended that the New Jersey statute violated the equal
protection clause.33
The district court ruled that since the tolling provision only
preserved actions against foreign corporations not amenable to
personal service in New Jersey, and since Searle was amenable to
service under New Jersey's long-arm statute, there was no reasonable justification for the tolling statute's differential treatment of

30. The Court implied that a rule of virtual per se invalidity would be applied where
the regulation at issue discriminated against interstate commerce on its face. See Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-43 (1982); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 625-28 (1978).
More recently, the Court attempted to graft this per se analysis onto its standard
balancing test by first attempting to detemine whether the state law directly discriminates
against interstate commerce. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). Yet, the Court admitted in that same opinion that:
[T]here is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach. In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.
Id. at 579.
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. 455 U.S. 404 (1981).
33. Id. at 406.
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foreign corporations. 4 Before the court of appeals could hear
Cohn's appeal, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
section 2A:14-22 against an identical challenge, on the grounds
that the difficulty in serving out-of-state defendants provided a rational basis for tolling the statute of limitations in a suit brought
against a foreign corporation unrepresented within the state. a5
Therefore, the court of appeals duly reversed the district court
and upheld the validity of the New Jersey statute.36

The Supreme Court, on review, adopted the reasoning of the
New Jersey Supreme Court:
[T]he unrepresented foreign corporation remains potentially
difficult to locate. Long-arm jurisdiction does not alleviate this
problem, since a New Jersey plaintiff must find the unrepresented foreign corporation before it can be served. . . . It is
true, of course, that respondents had little or no trouble locating
this particular, well-known defendant-petitioner, but the tolling
statute is premised on a reasonable assumption that unrepresented foreign corporations,
as a general rule, may not be so
7
easy to find and serve.3
Searle also raised the arguments that section 2A:14-22 violated
the due process and commerce clauses. The Court, however, re-

jected the due process argument as not properly before it,3s and
declined to consider the commerce clause argument due to the
"opaque" nature of the New Jersey Supreme Court's only com-

ment on the issue.3 9 The Supreme Court therefore remanded the
case to the district court for further consideration of the com34. Id. at 406-07.
35. Velmohos v. Maren Eng'g Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 295-97, 416 A.2d 372, 381
(1980).
36. The decision of the court of appeals was consolidated with Hopkins v. KelseyHayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 539 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980). In Hopkins, a different federal district judge ruled that § 2A:14-22 was consistent with the equal
protection and due process clauses. Id. at 542.
37. Searle, 455 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 413 n.7.
39. The Court stated that:
The dispute over the Commerce Clause centers in what seems to us to be an
opaque footnote in the New Jersey Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Velmohos ....
"We note that whatever hardship on foreign corporations might
be caused by continued exposure to suit can be easily eliminated by the designation of an agent for service of process within the state." . ..
[This] lone sentence in the Velmohos footnote by itself does not clearly
demonstrate the correctness of either [party's] view or lucidly inform us as to
what the state law is.
Id. at 413-14.
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merce clause claim. 40
Before the district court could hear the case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court again intervened. That court struck down section
2A:14-22 on the grounds that it discriminated against interstate
commerce on its face by "forc[ing] licensure on foreign corporations dealing exclusively in interstate commerce by otherwise
preventing them from gaining the benefit of the statute of limitations defense. ' 41 The federal district court followed suit, and accordingly granted Searle's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that, in the absence of section 2A:14-22, the statute of
limitations had expired.42
The Supreme Court's decision in Searle precluded the equal
protection avenue of attack which Midwesco may otherwise have
followed in Bendix Autolite. More importantly, however, the district court's decision on remand set the stage for the commerce
clause attack on the Ohio tolling statute that Midwesco did
undertake.
II. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises
The Supreme Court invalidated section 2305.15 of the Ohio
Revised Code in an eight to one decision, with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority. Justice Scalia concurred in a separate
opinion, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
A.

Opinion of the Court

The majority began by noting that the Court could have analyzed Ohio's tolling statute under either of two approaches. Since
the tolling provision of section 2305.15 applied to persons outside
the state of Ohio and not to persons within the state, the statute
was discriminatory on its face and could therefore be declared invalid "without extended inquiry. ' 4 The Court instead chose "to
weigh and assess the State's putative interests against the interstate restraints to determine if the burden imposed [was] a rea-

40. Id. at 414.
41. Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307, 318-19, 463 A.2d 921, 927
(1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 (1985).
42. Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 598 F. Supp. 965, 969 (D.N.J. 1984).
43. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 108 S. Ct. 2218, 2220 (1988). This

is the "per se invalid" approach followed in Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257
U.S. 282, 291 (1921), and Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974).
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'
sonable one."44
The majority concluded that the burden the tolling provision
placed upon foreign corporations was "significant." Ordinarily,
Midwesco would not be subject to the general jurisdiction of Ohio
courts,45 but only to the more limited jurisdiction available under
the Ohio long-arm statute. 46 Midwesco could only escape the consequences of section 2305.15, however, by appointing an agent to
receive service of process within the state.47 That appointment
would allow Ohio to establish personal jurisdiction over Midwesco
for any action brought in an Ohio court, 48 regardless of the origin

44. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2220. This is the more traditional "balancing"
approach. See supra note 20.
45. Midwesco did not maintain an office in Ohio, it was not registered to do business
there, nor had it appointed a corporate agent for service of process within the state. Bendix
Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2221. Without more, Midwesco would lack the minimum contacts
with Ohio necessary for a state court to establish personal jurisdiction over the company.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Baldwin 1984) provides in pertinent part:
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
(I) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(B) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him.
47. Bendix argued that Midwesco could have avoided section 2305.15 without formally registering to do business in Ohio by either designating an agent to receive service
within the state in its contract with Bendix, or by giving notice to the secretary of state.
The Court rejected both assertions as without statutory foundation. Bendix Autolite, 108
S. Ct. at 2222.
48. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.041 (Baldwin 1986) provides in pertinent part:
(A) Every foreign corporation for profit that is licensed to transact business
in this state, and every foreign nonprofit corporation that is licensed to exercise
its corporate privileges in this state, shall have and maintain an agent, sometimes referred to as the "designated agent," upon whom process against such
corporation may be served within this state .
(H) Process may be served upon a foreign corporation by delivering a copy
of it to its designated agent, if a natural person, or by delivering a copy of it at
the address of its agent in this state, as such address appears upon the record in
the office of the secretary of state.
(I) This section does not limit or affect the right to serve process upon a
foreign corporation in any other manner permitted by law.
In part to avoid the result in Dahnke-Walker and Allenberg, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1703.02 (Baldwin 1986) exempts foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce from the requirement of registering to do business in Ohio. This section does not,
however, remove foreign corporations from the reach of section 2305.15.
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of the underlying claim. "Requiring a foreign corporation to appoint an agent for service in all cases and to defend itself with
reference to all transactions, including those in which it did not
have the minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal
jurisdiction, is a significant burden."49
Ohio's interest in enacting section 2305.15 was to facilitate
service of process upon defendants outside the state, who might
otherwise be difficult to locate, by prodding them into designating
a statutory agent within the state. 50 While the Court noted that
such an interest was "important," Midwesco had been subject to
service under Ohio's long-arm statuie throughout the four-year
period of limitation. 5 1 Thus, section 2305.15 offered no additional
protection to Ohio residents injured by the actions of a foreign
corporation. Rather, that section conditioned the availability of a
statute of limitations defense on the waiver of rights that
Midwesco would otherwise retain.52 Although one does not have a
fundamental right to a statute of limitations defense,53 the Court
stated that such a defense is "an integral part of the legal system
and [is] relied upon to project [sic] the liabilities of persons and
corporations active in the commercial sphere." 54 By depriving
Midwesco of that defense without substantially advancing the interests of the state, the majority concluded that section 2305.15
placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.55
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, concurring separately, criticized the analytical
approach taken by the majority as entirely too speculative. He ob-

49. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2221.
50. Id. at 2222.
51. Both parties conceded that Midwesco could have been served under Ohio Revised Code section 2307.382 throughout the four-year period of limitation. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2222.
52. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2221.
53. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
[Statutes of limitation] represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.
Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a "fundamental"
right or what used to be called a "natural" right of the individual. He may, of
course, have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas
of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to
a relatively large degree of legislative control.

Id.
54.
55.

Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2221.
Id. at 2222.
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jected that the labelling of the competing state and private inter-

ests as "important" and "significant" was meaningless, and that
the majority's final weighing of those interests was a comparison
of apples to oranges. 56 Indeed, Scalia would abandon the "balancing" approach in dormant commerce clause cases as an area better left to Congress.57 In its place he advocates a return to the

narrower, per se analysis: "[A] state statute is invalid under the
Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a
lawful state purpose. ' 58 Since section 2305.15 was discriminatory
on its face, and there were no valid state interests advanced to

justify that discrimination, Justice Scalia also found the tolling
statute to be in violation of the commerce clause. 59

C.

Dissenting Opinion

Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, accepted the analysis of
the majority but rejected its result. While Midwesco was engaged
in interstate commerce when it contracted to sell one of its boiler
56. Justice Scalia stated:
I cannot confidently assess whether the Court's evaluation and balancing of interests in this case is right or wrong. Although the Court labels the effect of
exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio's courts "a significant burden" on
commerce, I am not sure why that is. .
On the other side of the scale, the Court considers the benefit of the Ohio
scheme to local interests. . . . We have no way of knowing how often these ends
are in fact achieved, and the Court thus says little about them except to call
them "an important factor to consider."
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the Court
then proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called
"balancing," but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests
on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular
line is longer than a particular rock is heavy. All I am really persuaded of by the
Court's opinion is that the burdens the Court labels "significant" are more determinative of its decision than the benefits it labels "important."
Id. at 2223 (citations omitted).
57.
58.

Id. at 2224.
Id.

59. Justice Scalia argued that:
A tolling statute that operated only against persons beyond the reach of Ohio's
long-arm statute, or against all persons that could not be found for mail service,
would be narrowly tailored to advance the legitimate purpose of preserving
claims; but the present statute extends the time for suit even against corporations which (like [Midwesco]) are fully suable within Ohio, and readily reachable through the mails.
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systems to Bendix, he contended that the company was engaged in
intrastate commerce when it contracted to install that system. 0
Since a state may properly regulate intrastate commerce, Ohio
could properly require Midwesco to register to do business within
the state."' Rehnquist concluded that section 2305.15 did no more
than require registration and placed no greater burden on
Midwesco than it could properly place on any other entity doing
business in Ohio. He concluded that the Ohio tolling statute was
valid.6 2
III.

ANALYSIS

In light of previous holdings, the decision in Bendix Autolite
appears to be an easy one. The burdens imposed by section
2305.15 fall disproportionately upon businesses incorporated
outside Ohio that actually do business within the state, and the
practice of invalidating such regulations under the dormant commerce clause is well-established. 63 Yet, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist both mounted attacks on the majority's decision
that merit closer examination.
A.

Balancing National and Local Interests

By holding section 2305.15 unconstitutional, the majority expressly chose to balance the competing interests affected by the
statute, even though Justice Kennedy remarked that the Court
could have found the statute invalid per se. 6 4 Traditional balancing under the dormant commerce clause involves a weighing of
interests - the national interest in unfettered trade between the
states against the local interest in regulation. Yet, these national
interests have not been articulated by Congress and are merely
presumed by the Court." Therefore, when the Court finds that

60. Id. at 2225.
61. Id. (citing to Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-on-Drugs, 366 U.S. 276, 276 (1961)).
62. Id.
63. See supra note 19.
64. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2220-21.
65. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power and
an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state. While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it
does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional
action, nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not commerce
among the states. Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word,
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the local interest is unduly burdensome on interstate commerce
and invalidates the state law at issue, as it did in the Bendix case,
it is imposing its own values upon the states."
As Justice Scalia caustically remarked, the judicial branch is
ill-suited to make policy judgments in this area, a task specifically
delegated to Congress under the commerce clause.6 This is particularly true when the Court attempts to interpret congressional
silence under the dormant commerce clause. Under the current
standard, the greater the importance of the national interest at
stake and the greater the burden that the state regulation places
on that interest the greater the likelihood that the Court will invalidate the regulation. But these are the very situations most
likely to induce an administrative agency or Congress itself to
act. 8 Since the political response is more desirable from an institutional point of view, and the only response expressly provided in
the text of the Constitution, the Court arguably oversteps its authority when it engages in balancing under the dormant commerce
clause.6 9
Justice Scalia would avoid making policy judgments in this
area by limiting judicial analysis to a determination of whether
the means employed by the regulation being challenged are tailored to match the ends sought by the state.70 This is essentially a
return to the rule of per se invalidity followed in the DahnkeWalker and Allenberg cases. State efforts to discriminate against
non-residents for the sole purpose of securing commercial advantages for state residents would necessarily be an illegitimate end.
The Court has repeatedly held that a corporation of one state may
lawfully enter into another state for the purpose of engaging in
interstate trade free from any regulation which that state may
properly impose on resident corporations.Z Section 2305.15,

this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the
meaning it has given to these great silences of the Constitution.
Id.
66. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425,
429-35 (1982); Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 588-90.
67. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 223-24; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Eule, supra note 66, at 433-34.
69. Id. at 429-35; Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 591-99.
70. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2224.
71. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33 (1974); Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S.
197, 203-04 (1914); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910); Western
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which preserved actions against certain corporations solely on the

basis of their failure to reside or appoint a resident agent within
Ohio, falls into this category. Justice Scalia would therefore invalidate section 2305.15 because it does not advance any legitimate
state purpose.

2

B. Permissible Scope of State Regulation
The majority implicitly concluded that Midwesco's dealings
with Bendix were wholly interstate in nature. Under the dormant

commerce clause, a state law may not interfere or unduly burden
transactions of this type. Clearly, the arena in which a state may
properly regulate commerce is a small one, and even within those
walls it may only act when the outside repercussions are
insignificant.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wished to expand the parameters
within which the states could permissibly operate. He argued that
at least one aspect of Midwesco's dealings with Bendix - the installation of the boiler at Bendix's Fostoria plant -

was intrastate

in nature. 73 Relying on Eli Lilly, Rehnquist would argue that
state regulation of a foreign corporation engaged in business conducted wholly within the regulating state is permissible. 74 Rehnquist's reading of the facts placed Midwesco's activities within
Ohio outside the scope of the commerce clause.
In essence, Rehnquist would make the permissible reach of a

Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57

(1890).
72. Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2224.
73. Id. at 2224-25.
74. The result in Eli Lilly might be better explained as an extension of New Jersey's
political power rather than of its judicial power. One theory of commerce clause jurisprudence subjects foreign corporations to the laws of states in which they have a political voice
rather than where they do business. In essence, "intrastate" commerce would be defined as
transactions between parties represented in the legislative assembly of the state in which
the transaction occurred. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938)("when the regulation is of such a character that its burden
falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected
to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state"). For a more detailed presentation of this processbased theory, see Eule, supra note 66; Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. Eli Lilly & Co. had a presence within the state sufficient to
give it a voice in the political process that enacted the New Jersey registration statute.
Therefore, requiring Eli Lilly to comply with that statute does not amount to discrimination against interstate commerce. This argument, however, cuts against Rehnquist's
broader-based theory.
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state's ability to regulate commerce coextensive with the permissible reach of its courts. Yet, such an interpretation is overly broad.
The Ohio courts exercised jurisdiction over the Bendix-Midwesco
contract dispute under that state's long-arm statute. 5 In its absence, Midwesco would have lacked sufficient contacts with Ohio
for Ohio courts to establish personal jurisdiction over the company's commercial activities.7 6 Rehnquist's scheme would allow a
state to regulate any and all business taking place within its borders. There is no precedent for this position; indeed, the commerce
clause was included in the Constitution as a limitation on the
states' ability to regulate commerce.77 Even Eli Lilly, the case
upon which Rehnquist relies, only allows state regulation of foreign corporations over which it could assert personal jurisdiction
without recourse to a long-arm statute.7 8 As a result of this position, it appears that Rehnquist would do away with the dormant
commerce clause entirely.
CONCLUSION

In Bendix Autolite, the Court sent a clear signal that it will
continue to strike down state legislation that unduly burdens interstate trade and business under the dormant commerce clause.
Moreover, the Court will continue to balance the national interest
in free trade among the states against an individual state's interest
in a particular regulation in order to determine whether the regulation is unduly burdensome. Recent scholarship sharply criticizing this approach appears to have, for the most part, fallen upon
deaf ears. Only Justice Scalia has questioned the role taken by the
Court in this area. A solid seven-member majority supports the
continued viability of traditional commerce clause jurisprudence.
JOHN

75.
76.
77.
78.

Bendix Autolite, 108 S. Ct. at 2222.
See supra note 45.
See generally Redish & Nugent, supra note 11.
See supra note 74.
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